President Obama and the Islamic World: Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Many analysts consider the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the chief focus of the Islamic World in the Middle East. Historically, the Arab World has perceived the United States as the supporter of Israel. Thus, if President Obama wanted to shift the public opinion in the Arab World he had to alter this policy.
On the one hand, President Obama had a different approach towards Israel in the peace process. The huge pressure over Israel for freezing its settlements caused the bitterness of the U.S.-Israeli relations up to the extent that Prime Minister Netanyahu did not even take the common photos with President Obama while visiting the White House. Although the tension now seems to be eliminated, its presence was historical. The fundamental outcome of this policy was a freeze in the settlements which was a positive step towards the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. Nevertheless, some scholars such as Reza Aslan argue that in depth the settlements were not fully frozen. Similarly, President Obama had several times insisted on the necessity for a change in the Palestinian language towards Israel.
One the other hand, Martin Indyk, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel, argues that President Obama went too far in supporting the Arab World. Meanwhile President Obama gave memorial speeches in Ankara and Cairo, there was no such speech in Israel. Indyk argues that the lack of communication with the Israeli government and society and unusual pressures on Israel from the United States created a huge gap between President Obama and the Israeli government and society rendering it challenging to cooperate to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, it is necessary to ask whether President Obama had any other options rather than pressuring Israel when the ongoing settlements are a complex problem of this conflict? Nevertheless, Indyk believes that a more balance approach from the Obama administration is required to reach conclusions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Mark Lynch, a professor of social sciences at George Washington University, questions the creativity of President Obama’s policy towards the conflict. He states that meanwhile there was the expectation of a new agenda; President Obama took similar steps to President Bush. He argues that the Obama administration did not spend a great focus on solving the Gaza blockade or the reconstruction of the Palestinian territory. He believes that President Obama had to consider Hamas as a key player of this conflict; thus using similar policies such as Turkey’s approach to engage Hamas more actively. Yet, one has to consider the role of public opinion in the policies of the governments. The perception of the Turkish society towards Hamas is certainly not the same as the United States’. The role of the public opinion will be specifically analyzed in another section of this series. President Obama’s Israeli-Palestinian agenda was not designed without any creativity. The unique pressure on the Israeli settlement was certainly an evidence of a new approach. But, perhaps the engagement of Turkey as a partner favored by both sides, the Arab world and Israel, could have been another creative option.
Overall, President Obama’s Israeli-Palestinian approach had certain new elements. Nevertheless, there are no signs of a major, positive impact of this approach in this dilemma. Did President Obama’s approach fail due to the policy itself or due to the negative response of the Palestinian and Israeli partners? Although decreasing, hope is still alive as the Israeli and Palestinian authorities hold direct negotiations in a few weeks.

President Obama and the Islamic World: Introduction

After Barack Obama took office as the new President of the United States, the world expected an innovative approach towards the Islamic world from the new administration. President Obama’s historical speeches in Ankara and Cairo demonstrated a new agenda towards the Islamic world. The language of the U.S. administration radically changed and either a term such as the “global war on terror” was eliminated or terrorism was often replaced by extremism. Indeed, President Obama’s agenda created a great deal of optimism and hope for the U.S.-Muslim relations. The polls illustrated an enormous support for the new U.S. administration in the Islamic World.
However, more than 16 month after taking the office, President Obama is facing rapid decrease in the initial optimism towards his administration approach to the Islamic World. This reduction is vey essential in the U.S.’s foreign and even domestic policy. Outside the borders the United States is involved with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, extremism, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran among many other crucial issues related to the Islamic World. Domestically, the decrease can illustrate the efficacy of his approach to fundamental issues such as closing the Guantanamo prison. Hence, this series of analysis aims to discuss the extent to which the Obama administration was successful with its policy towards the Islamic World by assessing the administration’s approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran and the role of the public opinion in applying the policies. Nevertheless, the analysis will be limited as it does not consider the role of other crucial factors such as Iraq and Afghanistan in judging President Obama’s approach towards the Islamic World.

Iranian Economy: Tehran's Baazar's Strike

In the first week of July, after the government tried to increase the taxes by 70%, the usually blasting Tehran’s Grand Bazaar went on a strike. Despite the government’s offer to reduce the initial 70% increase to 15%; the strike spreader to Tabriz’s Grand Bazaar as well, creating a major and historical crisis for the Ahmadinejad’s government. Although the strike is now over, the enduring news of the Iranian tax reforms maintains the concern among the merchants in the bazaar.
The heavy pressure of the International sanctions and the low prices of oil have persuaded the Iranian government to reconsider its tax policy. “Iran imposes valued added tax (VAT) at 3% on large corporations but not on smaller” (The Economist) business, leaving out the bazaar’s merchants. Historically, Tehran’s bazaar had a significant role in the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Their financial support for the anti-shah movements was a crucial assistance for Khomeini’s supporters. In fact, the cost of Khomeini’s historical flight from Paris to Tehran after the victory of the revolution was provided by the bazaar’s merchants. The influence of the Tehran’s bazaar within the country’s politics has rendered any reforms related to the bazaar’s business challenging.
The slow economy, increasing inflation, the concerning influence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in the domestic economy and President Ahmadinejad’s policy of reforming the tax system has increased the number of his oppositions among the bazaar’s merchants. This means that as the critics of President Ahmadinejad are increasing, he has to fight on more fronts. If he is not able to diplomatically compromise a solution for such crisis, either his policies will be left incomplete or President Ahmadinejad has to rely on the influence of the Revolutionary Guard, increasing the militarization of the Iranian economy.

-Joy-

Joy is the words of an aching,sleepless brain on an early Tuesday morning.

-Joy-

Living in dreams:
I rule the lord
I own a world
I sense the joy

Living in reality:
I chase the wave
I own a cave
I sense the joy

Is Iran Moving Towards a Military Dictatorship?

While Iran has continued its nuclear enrichment, the United-States has used unilateral and UN sanctions to alter the Iranian policy. Most significantly, the new UN and U.S. sanctions have a strict focus on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG). It appears; that the increasing role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard within the country’s political matters has become a fundamental concern of the Obama administration. Describing the situation of the Iranian politics, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Iran is “moving towards a military dictatorship”. Hence, it is crucial to assess the state of the Revolutionary Guard in the Iranian politics.
The Revolutionary Guard has been severely criticized for the crackdown of the opposition movement, following the June 2009 Iranian presidential elections. Although initially its role was not fully clear, the comments of the commander of the Iranian Police, Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, shed light on the crucial position of the IRG in maintaining Tehran’s security after the elections. In an interview with Soroush Magazine on June 16 he said: “After the elections the Iranian police passed on all its authority to the Sarallah station of the Revolutionary Guard and this station was in charge of the security of Tehran.” Despite the authority of the Iranian police in controlling the urban security, the increasing role of the Revolutionary Guard gave it the power to replace the police. The post-election era was a critical period for the Iranian regime, thus they appeared to use military means to preserve power. Nevertheless, this illustrates the reduction of the power of the police and amplification of the influence the Revolutionary Guard.
In addition, the Revolutionary Guard created a “cyber army” to fight against “cyber terrorism”. Initially, this clash had started by arresting many opposition bloggers. However, after the elections the cyber clash entered a new era. The Revolutionary Guard created a website posting pictures of demonstrators and asking the ordinary citizens to help arresting them. Furthermore, a group of hackers attacked several opposition websites. Shortly the Revolutionary Guard confirmed its relationship with this group. Meanwhile this demonstrates the increasing fear of the current government from the role of technology in the strategies of the opposition movement; it exemplifies the increasing power of the Revolutionary Guard. Moreover, it can be observed as a warning for the opposition movement. If the government observers any threat to its authority, it is ready to use any means for maintaining its power.
The Iranian constitution denies the right for the military to participate in any political and economical matters. However, there are no signs of this law in practice. After the June 2009 elections, President Ahmadinejad was supported by the Iranian Parliament in appointing, Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, a veteran of the revolutionary Guard as the interior minister. Although Mr. Najjar was not anymore officially involved in the Military matters, it is difficult to imagine that he does not have any connection with his ex-colleagues. In addition, on June 25th, the cultural minister of Iran appointed Bahman Dari, the head of Revolutionary Guard Publications, as his cultural adviser. A fundamental position of the cultural adviser is holding book exhibitions and publication sensors. Thus, this is a significant example of the crucial position of the Revolutionary Guard in the Iranian culture. This can give the capacity for producing the necessary propaganda to the Revolutionary Guard and enable it to reject any opposition publications.
Furthermore, the Revolutionary Guard has boosted its position in the Iranian economy. An Iranian legislation requires the privatization of governmentally owned companies. However, in a major economical transaction, after a private company was rejected due to security reasons, two companies connected to the Revolutionary Guard bought major shares of the Telecommunication Company of Iran in Tehran’s Stock Market. As this was against the legislation, it was heavily criticized by the Iranian Parliament. This exchange led to rumors regarding the control of Revolutionary Guard over the private phone lines. Although it has never been confirmed, it is a possibility.
Four years ago, President Ahmadinejad gave two sections of the Iranian “South Pars” gas project to the Revolutionary Guard. Furthermore, after the restrictions created by the U.S. unilateral sanctions for the petroleum companies to deal with Iran, President Ahmadinejad gave an enormous section of the “South Pars” project to the Revolutionary Guard. For many years, different Iranian governments had been negotiating with variety of international companies, including Shell and Total, to sign the best possible deal for this project. But, it seems that the recent sanctions convinced the government to pass the project to the Revolutionary Guard. This can be also considered as a political move by the Ahmadinejad administration to undermine the efficacy of the sanctions. Additionally, as the petroleum industry plays a crucial role in the Iranian economy and politics, such positions can increase the influence of the Revolutionary Guard in the Iranian politics. Therefore, it appears that although the sanction might limit the Iranian Revolutionary Guard internationally, it is increasing its influence domestically. Consequently, one should not be surprised if the IRG supports further sanctions and isolation of the Iranian politics; rendering it extremely challenging to conclude a diplomatic solution for the Iranian nuclear program.
Nonetheless, one should question the technological capability of the Revolutionary Guard in organizing complex petroleum projects. At last the IRG is a military organization with significant economical power and not a petroleum firm. On June 16th, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard dispensed the “South Pars” gas project which was dedicated to it by President Ahmadinejad four years before. On the one hand, this might be because of technological difficulties. One the other hand, it can be due to accepting the second project following the the U.S. sanctions on June 25th. Overall, if the IRG does not have the knowledge to arrange petroleum projects, in the long term the Iranian economy and society will be facing severe damages from it.
It has to be mentioned that this is analysis is limited to the information available publicly. However, observing these evidence one can clearly illustrate the raise of IRG’s power. The amplification of the authority of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard can have singular affects on the Iranian politics, society and economy. The increasing role of the IRG has an opposite relationship with the Iranian democratic dream. It is crucial for the opposition movement to inform the society of the possible catastrophically consequences of this influence. It is also up to moderate conservatives in the Iranian Parliament to prevent the increase of the Revolutionary Guard’s power. Otherwise, their authority as elected officials will be challenged.

The Ban of the Burqa in France

On July 13th, the French parliament voted overwhelmingly to ban the full-face-covering niqab and burqa in public. While President Sarkozy himself lobbied for it, this law considers a 150 Euros fine for women violators and heavy penalties for the men enforcing female relatives to cover their face. As this wave of burqa ban is moving towards other European countries and the provincial government of Quebec, it is essential to take a moment and consider the arguments surrounding this issue and its potential implications.
The French lower house passed this legislation on the grounds of the necessity to maintain the French values of individualism and human dignity. Moreover, various women rights activists demonstrated burqa as a symbol of women’s suppression and saw this law a victory for gender equality. Although one might observe this legislation in favor of individualism, one can also illustrate the opposite. If individualism stands upon independence and self-reliance, then one has to be permitted to choose how to live. Based on this value one should not be forced to wear burqa, but one should not be forced to not wear burqa either. It is challenging to distinguish whether one is forced or volunteered to wear the niqab, but this legislation does not solve this problem. Its broad application ignores the details and builds upon a general ground of individualism rendering it hypocritical.
One might argue that the secular nature of the French constitution does not permit the usage of religious symbols. As the Christian cross is not permitted in the public, so should the Islamic symbols. This drives the discussion to the question of whether burqa is a religious or a cultural symbol. “Grand sheikh of al-Azhar in Cairo, Sheikh Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, described the niqab as a "cultural tradition that had nothing to do with Islam”” (Council on Foreign Relations). As a limitation of this article, I am not in a position to judge if burqa is cultural or religious. Nevertheless, if the Islamic sheikh is biased, so are the secular French MPs.
Some supporters of this law argue on the bases of security. As the face of an individual is covered, identification becomes impossible. However, the national security of any European country has never been threatened by an individual wearing a burqa. None of the terrorist attacks has occurred using niqab as a cover. It might prevent the usage of niqab for any threat for the French national security in the future. But there are far more significant areas related to security for the French government to focus on, including the French crime rate.
Polls show 82% support of the public for the ban (Pew Global Attitudes Project). However, among the 5 to 6 million Muslims living in France, fewer than two thousand wear the full veil. This low number raises major questions about the necessity for such a controversial legislation. The contemporaneous of this legislation with the “war on terror”, can assist the understanding of the reasons for the public’s support. Extremism is not the way to fight fanaticism. It is just a method creating justifications for further fanatic actions.
Edward R. Murrow once said: “History is what we make. If we go on as we are; history will make its revenge and retribution will not limp in catching up with it.”
Image: abc.net

Is It the Right Time for Direct Negotiations?

After the recent meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Obama at the White House, both sides insisted on the unique ties between the countries and expressed their serious concerns on the Iranian nuclear program. In addition, they emphasized their desire to resume the direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiation. Meanwhile the Palestinian and Israeli officials are preparing for the upcoming discussion; there are no evidences suggesting a major shift in either of the side’s policies.
One of the significant concerns of the Palestinian officials has been the issue of the boarders, including East-Jerusalem as their capital. Despite the Palestinian requests, speaking at the White House and the Council on Foreign Relations, Prime Minister Netanyahu stressed that he is not willing to extend the freeze on the settlement’s construction any further than his previous date in September. As the Palestinians want to build up their state in the West-Bank, the Israeli settlements in that region is problematic. In the short term, it is seen as an invasion of their land by the Palestinians, increasing the popularity of radical solutions. In the long term, it can decrease the support for a two-state solution, rendering peace more challenging as the sides then have to think of a solution for moving hundreds of Israeli settlers. Furthermore, the argument regarding Jerusalem maintains. Although the Palestinians claim East-Jerusalem as their capital, Israelis continue to declare Jerusalem as their capital.
Moreover, despite the emphasis of President Obama on the necessity for a change in the Palestinian official's language, President Abbas maintains to include incitement against Israel. Speaking after the death of Mohammed Oudeh, mastermind of the 1972 Munich Olympics attacks, he said: “The deceased was one of the prominent leaders of the Fatah movement and lived a life filled with the struggle, devoted effort, and the enormous sacrifice of the deceased for the sake of the legitimate problem of his people.” Considering that Oudeh was remembered by the Israelis as a terrorist killing Israeli civilian, one can regard this speech as a fundamental provocation. This can lead to similar reactions by the Israeli society and politicians.
Hence as both sides appear to sustain their previous positions, what is the necessity for a direct peace negotiation? From an intrastate perspective, President Obama has been criticized for his Middle-East policies. As the Senate elections are coming up, it is crucial for President Obama and Democrats to show a progress in their Middle-East agenda to counter the criticism. In addition, the matters surrounding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will not get solved unless both sides negotiate over their desirable outcomes. Thus this direct conversation can be an opportunity for them to share their views on the conflict and attempt to achieve a solution. However, the failure of these negotiations can fundamentally disturb President Abbas’ credibility. While President Abbas fails to progress in solving the conflict, more Palestinians can start supporting Hamas to achieve a solution. This will increase the power of Hamas and can seriously damage the authority of President Abbas. Therefore, it appears that time is playing on the side of Hamas. The failure of negotiations between Fatah and Israel increases the necessity to start negotiations with Hamas. Talking about the position of Hamas in the peace negotiations, Khaled Meshal, the head of Hamas, recently stated: “We are patient.”
Image: The Economist