While Iran has continued its nuclear enrichment, the United-States has used unilateral and UN sanctions to alter the Iranian policy. Most significantly, the new UN and U.S. sanctions have a strict focus on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG). It appears; that the increasing role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard within the country’s political matters has become a fundamental concern of the Obama administration. Describing the situation of the Iranian politics, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Iran is “moving towards a military dictatorship”. Hence, it is crucial to assess the state of the Revolutionary Guard in the Iranian politics.
The Revolutionary Guard has been severely criticized for the crackdown of the opposition movement, following the June 2009 Iranian presidential elections. Although initially its role was not fully clear, the comments of the commander of the Iranian Police, Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, shed light on the crucial position of the IRG in maintaining Tehran’s security after the elections. In an interview with Soroush Magazine on June 16 he said: “After the elections the Iranian police passed on all its authority to the Sarallah station of the Revolutionary Guard and this station was in charge of the security of Tehran.” Despite the authority of the Iranian police in controlling the urban security, the increasing role of the Revolutionary Guard gave it the power to replace the police. The post-election era was a critical period for the Iranian regime, thus they appeared to use military means to preserve power. Nevertheless, this illustrates the reduction of the power of the police and amplification of the influence the Revolutionary Guard.
In addition, the Revolutionary Guard created a “cyber army” to fight against “cyber terrorism”. Initially, this clash had started by arresting many opposition bloggers. However, after the elections the cyber clash entered a new era. The Revolutionary Guard created a website posting pictures of demonstrators and asking the ordinary citizens to help arresting them. Furthermore, a group of hackers attacked several opposition websites. Shortly the Revolutionary Guard confirmed its relationship with this group. Meanwhile this demonstrates the increasing fear of the current government from the role of technology in the strategies of the opposition movement; it exemplifies the increasing power of the Revolutionary Guard. Moreover, it can be observed as a warning for the opposition movement. If the government observers any threat to its authority, it is ready to use any means for maintaining its power.
The Iranian constitution denies the right for the military to participate in any political and economical matters. However, there are no signs of this law in practice. After the June 2009 elections, President Ahmadinejad was supported by the Iranian Parliament in appointing, Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, a veteran of the revolutionary Guard as the interior minister. Although Mr. Najjar was not anymore officially involved in the Military matters, it is difficult to imagine that he does not have any connection with his ex-colleagues. In addition, on June 25th, the cultural minister of Iran appointed Bahman Dari, the head of Revolutionary Guard Publications, as his cultural adviser. A fundamental position of the cultural adviser is holding book exhibitions and publication sensors. Thus, this is a significant example of the crucial position of the Revolutionary Guard in the Iranian culture. This can give the capacity for producing the necessary propaganda to the Revolutionary Guard and enable it to reject any opposition publications.
Furthermore, the Revolutionary Guard has boosted its position in the Iranian economy. An Iranian legislation requires the privatization of governmentally owned companies. However, in a major economical transaction, after a private company was rejected due to security reasons, two companies connected to the Revolutionary Guard bought major shares of the Telecommunication Company of Iran in Tehran’s Stock Market. As this was against the legislation, it was heavily criticized by the Iranian Parliament. This exchange led to rumors regarding the control of Revolutionary Guard over the private phone lines. Although it has never been confirmed, it is a possibility.
Four years ago, President Ahmadinejad gave two sections of the Iranian “South Pars” gas project to the Revolutionary Guard. Furthermore, after the restrictions created by the U.S. unilateral sanctions for the petroleum companies to deal with Iran, President Ahmadinejad gave an enormous section of the “South Pars” project to the Revolutionary Guard. For many years, different Iranian governments had been negotiating with variety of international companies, including Shell and Total, to sign the best possible deal for this project. But, it seems that the recent sanctions convinced the government to pass the project to the Revolutionary Guard. This can be also considered as a political move by the Ahmadinejad administration to undermine the efficacy of the sanctions. Additionally, as the petroleum industry plays a crucial role in the Iranian economy and politics, such positions can increase the influence of the Revolutionary Guard in the Iranian politics. Therefore, it appears that although the sanction might limit the Iranian Revolutionary Guard internationally, it is increasing its influence domestically. Consequently, one should not be surprised if the IRG supports further sanctions and isolation of the Iranian politics; rendering it extremely challenging to conclude a diplomatic solution for the Iranian nuclear program.
Nonetheless, one should question the technological capability of the Revolutionary Guard in organizing complex petroleum projects. At last the IRG is a military organization with significant economical power and not a petroleum firm. On June 16th, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard dispensed the “South Pars” gas project which was dedicated to it by President Ahmadinejad four years before. On the one hand, this might be because of technological difficulties. One the other hand, it can be due to accepting the second project following the the U.S. sanctions on June 25th. Overall, if the IRG does not have the knowledge to arrange petroleum projects, in the long term the Iranian economy and society will be facing severe damages from it.
It has to be mentioned that this is analysis is limited to the information available publicly. However, observing these evidence one can clearly illustrate the raise of IRG’s power. The amplification of the authority of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard can have singular affects on the Iranian politics, society and economy. The increasing role of the IRG has an opposite relationship with the Iranian democratic dream. It is crucial for the opposition movement to inform the society of the possible catastrophically consequences of this influence. It is also up to moderate conservatives in the Iranian Parliament to prevent the increase of the Revolutionary Guard’s power. Otherwise, their authority as elected officials will be challenged.
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