On June 9th, UN Security Council passed resolution 1929 with 12 states voting in favor of the sanctions against the Iranian atomic program. The fourth round of sanctions has a major focus on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) as well as the arms restrictions. Although the new resolution is an accomplishment against the Iranian atomic program, the setting of it has raised doubts regarding its efficacy.
Meanwhile the new sanctions mentions the IRCG and IRISL, it only “calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over those transactions involving the IRGC that could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems” (text of the resolution 1929). Thus on the one hand, “it falls short of actually mandating international action against these entities” (Christopher R. Wall, Foreign policy Magazine), unless they were contributing to the Iranian nuclear activity. One the other hand, any further blockade appears to be unreasonable at the moment as it will render it extremely difficult to convince other Security Council members to set aside their economical ties with Iran and blockade every Revolutionary Guard or Iranian Shipping Lines activity. Furthermore, a total blockade can carry the potential of a military conflict in the current chaos of the middle-east.
Moreover, the resolution targets the Iranian financial system by prohibiting Iranian banking activities such as “opening new branches” or “establishing new joint ventures” to prevent financial services if there are “reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems” (text of the resolution 1929). Thus it does require evidence of the relationship between the financial actions and Iran’s proliferation-sensitive activity for applying the sanctions. However, as the Iranian central bank has been previously accused of supporting the countries proliferation program, it opens new grounds for stronger sanction against the Iranian financial system.
Crucially, the resolutions text sates “that Iran shall not acquire an interest in any commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technology.” This can effectively limit Iran obtaining uranium from Venezuela and Bolivia. Although the sanction forbids “uranium mining” and the IAEA magazine states that the uranium ore can be produced from the “underground mines” and the “open-pit mines”, it is not fully clear if uranium mining includes ores.
Most significantly, the sanction sets new arms restrictions, such as banning activities involving “ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.” However, the resolution does not prohibit Russia from “selling S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Iran because those weapons are not covered by the resolution's technical definition of a missile listed on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms” (Foreign policy). Despite the recent comment of the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton on the union of major powers against the Iranian nuclear program, this major gap in the sanctions determines the lack of a united agreement between Russia and the U.S.
Despite President Obama’s trip to Lebanon and his new policy on the Islamic world, Lebanon was the only country with an abstained vote. On the surface, this can undermine the effectiveness of the modern Obama policy. In depth, this is highlighting the influence of pro-Iranian Hezbollah on the Lebanese foreign policy.
Resolution 1929 is certainly an achievement for the Obama administration after month of diplomatic negotiations. One the one hand, one can question the efficacy of the sanctions and require stronger restriction to prevent a nuclear Iran. One the other hand, although that does not seem to be a current strategy of Iran as it can gives rise to the possibility of a military confrontation, one has to remember that as Robert Gates said, an overwhelming pressure can persuade the Iranian hardliner politicians to adopt a more isolationist policy by quitting the IAEA and closing further diplomatic options; a threat which the Iranian parliament is seeking to use by announcing that it will “reconsider relations with the UN nuclear watchdog, following the latest round of UN sanctions” (BBC News). If preventing a nuclear Iran is the current policy of the United States and sanctions, a method to apply this policy, then other methods are required for adaptation of this policy. Unilateral, U.S. sanctions and espionage appears to be the most reasonable options.
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